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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

Case No. 890429-CA

v.
Category No. 2

JOHN J. MURPHY,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a conviction of distribution of a
controlled substance, to wit marijuana, a third degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii) (1986), based
upon a plea of guilty by defendant, conditioned upon defendant
preserving his right to appeal the trial court's denial of his
motion to suppress.

This Court has jurisdiction to hear the

appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1989).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
The issues presented in this appeal are:
1.

Is the trial court's factual finding that

defendant's package was subjected to only a private search
clearly erroneous?
2.

Is the trial court's factual finding that a private

citizen voluntarily relinquished defendant's package to law
enforcement clearly erroneous?
3.

Is the government constitutionally required to

secure a search warrant prior to performing confirmatory chemical

4.

Did the trial court have a substantial basis from

which to conclude that the affidavit in support of the search
warrant for defendant's home was sufficient to support probable
cause?
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The applicable statutes and constitutional provisions
for a determination of this case are:
1. Amendment IV, United States Constitution:
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized,
2.

Article I, Section 14, Utah Constitution:

The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not
be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, John J. Murphy, was charged by an
information filed September 27, 1988, with distribution of a
controlled substance, marijuana, a third degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii) (1986),
possession with intent to distribute, marijuana, a third degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (1986),
possession of marijuana without a tax stamp affixed, a third
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 57-19-106(2)

(Supp. 1989), and possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class B
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann* § 58-37(a)-5 (1986)
(R. 2-4). Defendant filed a pretrial motion to suppress the
evidence (R. 41-2).

Memorandum was submitted by both parties (R.

45-85, 203-230). An evidentiary hearing was held on February 6,
1989, before the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick, Judge, Third
Judicial District, State of Utah (R. 231). Defendant's motion to
suppress was denied.

On March 6, 1989, written "Findings of Fact

and Conclusions of Law" were entered (R. 246-49).

Defendant

subsequently entered a negotiated plea of guilty to Count I,
distribution of marijuana, as a third degree felony, specifically
reserving his right to appeal the trial court's denial of his
motion to suppress (R. 293, 297). Based on the plea, Counts II,
III and IV were dismissed without prejudice (R. 291, 297). The
trial court and parties agreed that defendant's:
Plea is conditional to preserve defendant's
right to appeal of court's decision on his
motion to suppress. If Court of Appeals
reverses decision on above motion, State may
re-file Cts. 2, 3, & 4. [sic]
(R. 297). On June 19, 1989, defendant was sentenced to the
statutory indeterminate term of zero to five years in the Utah
State Prison.

The sentence was suspended and defendant placed on

probation under specified terms and conditions, including serving
fifteen days in jail and payment of $1000.00 in fines and
surcharges.
1989.

A Notice of Appeal was filed by defendant on July 3,

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On September 19, 1988, at approximately 9:00 a.m.,
defendant, John J. Murphy, entered the "Handle with Care"
packaging store in Park City, Utah to express mail a package to
California (R. 307 at 6; R. 308 at 11).L

Lee Ford, the sole

proprietor of the store, knew defendant from previous packaging
transactions (R. 307 at 6).
Defendant filled out a Federal. Express air bill for
shipping and handed the package to Mr. Ford (R. 307 at 6-7). Mr.
Ford followed his usual procedure of shaking the package to see
if it was sufficiently packed by the customer (R. 307 at 7).
Defendant's package rattled and Mr. Ford asked him if it
contained anything breakable.

Defendant replied that "it was

just some dog bones he was sending to a friend's dog" (R. 307 at
7-8).

Mr. Ford proceeded to process the package for shipping,

charging defendant the federal express rate and giving him a copy
of the air bill (R. 307 at 9, 11).
After defendant left the store, Mr. Ford went back to
custom packaging some art work he had been working on when
defendant entered (R. 307 at 8).
to ship defendant's package.

Awhile later, Mr. Ford prepared

Because he was still concerned

Two transcripts from separate cases were considered by the
trial court in ruling on defendant's motion to suppress. Both
have been included in the record on appeal. The transcript of
the preliminary hearing in defendant's case has been designated
on appeal as R.307; the transcript of the preliminary hearing in
the factually related case of State v. Arne Glenn Anderson has
been designated as R.308. Since the testimony of the witnesses
was basically the same in both preliminary hearings, the State
will refer only to the transcript of defendant's preliminary
hearing except as otherwise necessary.

about breakage due to the rattling in the package, Mr. Ford
opened defendant's package to add more loose-fill for shipping
(R. 307 at 8). Mr. Ford testified that he was not suspicious of
either defendant or the package at the time he opened it but
decided to help defendant avoid breakage because defendant was a
2
"nice guy" and frequented Ford's store (R. 307 at 16, 21-22).
When Lee Ford opened the package he first saw the dog
biscuits on top of some newspaper (R. 307 at 17).

Some of the

biscuits were broken and had fallen to the sides of the box under
the paper (R. 307 at 17). Mr. Ford opened the newspaper
packaging and immediately saw two packages containing what he
recognized to be marijuana (R. 307 at 17-18).

The marijuana was

wrapped in clear zip-lock baggies and could be seen without
unwrapping the baggies (R. 307 at 26-27).

Mr. Ford left the

package open (R. 307 at 31).
After opening defendant's package, a second individual
named Arne Glenn Anderson came into Ford's store to ship a
package almost identical to defendant's (R. 307 at 20; R. 308 at
6).

Mr. Ford became suspicious of the second package both

because of its similarity to defendant's and also due to the
actions of Anderson (R. 308 at 6-7). After Anderson left the
2
Mr. Ford testified that he was not initially suspicious of
defendant or his package. However, Detective Mary Ford testified
Lee Ford told her that, from living in Northern California, he
was aware that drug dealers often used dog bones as a scent cover
for drugs and was suspicious (R. 307 at 42-43). It is unclear
from the detective's testimony as to what point in time Lee Ford
became suspicious, i.e., prior to opening the package or after
opening it and seeing the dog bones on top of the newspapers. In
any case, the trial court factually concluded that Lee Ford was
suspicious but opened the package as a private citizen (R. 24647, Finding 3).

store, Mr. Ford opened the second package and again found
marijuana (R. 308 at 6-7). He then called the Park City Police
to report both packages and their contents (R. 307 at 17-18).
Within fifteen minutes, Detective Mary Ford, Park City
Police Department, responded to Lee Ford's call (R. 307 at 8).
Detective Ford is one of three detectives in the Park City Police
Department and is also the wife of Lee Ford (R. 307 at 18). She
took possession of the open packages from the store and got
physical descriptions of the individuals involved (R. 307 at 3132).

Based on this information, a search warrant was secured for

defendant's home (R. 20-21, R. 307 at 54).
Defendant's home was searched at approximately 5:28
p.m. on September 20, 1989 (R. 24). The Federal Express air bill
was found in defendant's kitchen.

Marijuana and drug

paraphernalia, as well as cash and records reflecting drug
trafficking, were found throughout the home (R. 24-25, 246).
Defendant was arrested driving to his home. At the time of the
arrest, defendant's wife consented to a search of their vehicle.
Additional marijuana was found (R. 248).
In the trial court, defendant moved for the suppression
of the package and its contents opened by Lee Ford, as well as
the evidence found pursuant to warrant at his home and pursuant
to consent in his vehicle (R. 41-42).

Defendant submitted the

matter to the court based on his memorandum and the transcripts
of the preliminary hearings in defendant's and Arne Anderson's
cases (see supra footnote 1). The trial court denied defendant's
motion finding:

1. That Lee Ford had not operated as an
agent of the government in opening
defendant's package;
2. That other than his marital relation with
Detective Ford, Lee Ford had no involvement
with the Park City Police Department;
3. That Lee Ford opened defendant's package
as a private citizen;
4. That defendant's home was searched
pursuant to a valid warrant;
5. That the items seized from defendant's
home were in plain view once in the home;
6. That defendant's wife had voluntarily
consented to the search of their vehicle;
and, that no evidence of coercion was
presented.
(R.

246-249).

(For complete "Findings of Facts and Conclusions

of Law," see attached Appendix).
In reaching its decision, the trial court considered
the following evidence.

During the eighteen months, Lee Ford had

owned the "Handle with Care" packaging store, he had opened
approximately fifty to one hundred packages for various reasons
associated with their packaging (R. 307 at 25; R. 308 at 15).
Approximately twelve of this number, were opened by Mr. Ford
because he was suspicious of their contents (R. 307 at 26).
Defendant's package and the Anderson package are included in this
number.

Of the twelve, on two other occasions from the two

referred to here, Mr. Ford found drugs (R. 307 at 25).

On the

two previous occasions, Mr. Ford also turned over the packages to
the Park City Police (R. 308 at 28-29).

On the two previous

occasions, the police were unable to identify the shippers.
Because of this, the police rewrapped the packages and shipped

them (R. 308 at 29).

Mr. Ford asked the police on those

occasions what he should do if the shippers called the store
about the packages.

The police instructed him on his response.

The shippers never recontacted the store and were never otherwise
apprehended (R. 308 at 29).
The Park City Police Department and Detective Mary
Ford, personally, never told Mr. Ford to continue opening
packages, never complemented him on his actions nor otherwise
encouraged his activities (R. 307 at 16; R. 308 at 24-25).
Ford received no reward or payment from the police.

Mr.

Mr. Ford

opened packages sent through his store for his own purposes,
those being his concern over retaining his franchise license if
he was found to have shipped drugs and his concern for liability
if objects shipped were delivered brokei (R. 307 at 17, 23-24; R.
308 at 18). The national guidelines given each independent owner
of a "Handle with Care" store are that the individual owner is
liable and directly responsible for any items shipped through
their stores.

The owners are instructed to open and inspect any

package that rattles, makes noise or is suspicious (R, 308 at 25;
R. 307 at 23-4).

The national guidelines, however, recommend

that the opening be done in the presence of the customer (R. 307
at 23-4).

Mr. Ford has generally not opened packages in the

presence of the customers and has not notified the customers that
the packages have been opened (R. 307 at 26).
Mr. Ford has not received any training, formal or
informal, as to what to look for in regards suspicious packages.
His wife has not discussed his activities with him other than to

tell him that, to deter drug shipments, he might consider posting
a sign that packages may be inspected (R. 308 at 17-18).

Both

the police and Detective Ford told Mr. Ford that they could not
advise or support his activities, that the decision of how to run
his business was his alone (R. 307 at 23; 308 at 18).

Mr. Ford

was tired of the problem and just wished "people wouldn't [ship
illegal items] because they're jeopardizing my business" (R. 308
at 18).
While defendant raised several issues below, his
conditional plea expressly reserved only the appeal of the motion
to suppress (R. 297). In this regard, defendant has challenged
on appeal only the initial search of his package by Mr. Ford and
the adequacy of the search warrant.

No issue is raised as to the

consent search of defendant's vehicle.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court properly denied defendant's motion to
suppress in that the search of defendant's property was carried
out by a private citizen who was not acting as a government
operative.

The police subsequently lawfully acquired defendant's

property from the private citizen.

No warrant was required for

the seizure since the contraband was in plain view when
voluntarily relinquished by the citizen.

Any confirmatory

chemical testing of the contraband was permissible as a
reasonable consequence of the lawful seizure.
The issuing magistrate, as well as the trial court, had
a substantial basis from which to conclude that probable cause
existed justifying the issuance of a search warrant of
defendant's home.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY CONCLUDED THAT
DEFENDANT'S PACKAGE WAS OPENED BY A PRIVATE
CITIZEN, WHO WAS NOT ACTING AS AN AGENT OF
THE GOVERNMENT; AND, THEREFORE THE SEARCH
INVOLVED NO CONSTITUTIONAL INFRINGEMENT.
Defendant contends that when Lee Ford, the owner of the
"Handle with Care" packaging store, opened defendant's package he
acted "in concert" with the police such that the search should be
viewed as a governmental search and subject to full
constitutional protections (Br. of App. at 13).

In support of

his contention, defendant claims that a pattern of tacit
encouragement by the police created an agency relationship with
Ford, turning him into a government operative.

In making this

claim, defendant ignores both the uncontroverted facts
established in the lower court and the caselaw of the Utah
appellate courts.
The applicable standard of review of a denial of a
motion to suppress evidence is that an appellate court will not
disturb the trial courts's factual evaluation unless its findings
are clearly erroneous.

State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah

1987).

Accord State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 326, 327 (Utah Ct. App.

1989).

A trial court's finding will be viewed as clearly

erroneous when it is "against the clear weight of the evidence"
or if the appellate court reaches a "definite and firm conviction
that a mistake has been made," State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935, 942
(Utah Ct. App. 1988).

Therefore, this Court must sustain the

trial court's factual findings unless those findings are against

the clear weight of the evidence or otherwise clearly erroneous;
but, may, as appropriate, review for error the lower court's
legal conclusions based on those factual findings.

State v.

Johnson, 771 P.2d at 327.
Additionally, the Utah appellate courts have
consistently recognized that constitutional protections do not
extend to private, nongovernmental searches.
The fourth amendment guarantee against
unreasonable searches and seizures protects
only against governmental actions and does
not extend to the independent acts of private
citizens. Thus, as was observed in Walter v.
United States, the exclusionary rule has no
application to evidence obtained from private
citizens acting on their own initiative: '[A]
wrongful search or seizure conducted by a
private party does not violate the Fourth
Amendment and ... such private wrongdoing
does not deprive the government of the right
to use evidence that it has acquired
lawfully.'
State v. Watts, 750 P.2d 1219, 1220 (Utah 1988).

The burden of

establishing any governmental involvement in a private search
rests entirely upon the party objecting to the introduction of
the evidence.

Ici. at 1221.

Each case must turn on its own facts. However, to
establish an agency relationship, it must be shown that the
government knew of the search prior to its occurrence and
acquiesced in it; and, that the primary intent and purpose of the
citizen in searching was to assist law enforcement.
Watts, 750 P.2d at 1221-22.

State v.

Factors to be considered are:

whether the police gave specific instructions regarding the
search; whether the police exercised control over the search or
the activities of the citizen; whether the police suspected

criminal activity on the part of the defendant prior to the
search; whether the citizen received any reward for the search;
and whether the specific actions of the citizen were, for the
most part, his own independent conduct or the substantial result
of the prompting and encouraging of the police.

Ici. at 1223. It

is not sufficient to establish an agency relationship to merely
to show that there was some antecedent conduct between the
citizen and the police.

Ld. at 1223. Nor, is it sufficient to

show that the citizen had some general motive of aiding law
enforcement, for:
[I]t is every citizen's civic duty ro do what
he can to aid in the control and prevention
of criminal activity, and 'it is no part of
the policy underlying the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments to discourage citizens
from aiding to the utmost of their ability in
the apprehension of criminals.'
United States v. Koeniq, 856 F.2d 843, 350 (7th Cir. 1988),
quoting Coolidqe v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 488 (1971).
Rather,
[A] defendant must prove some exercise of
governmental power over the private entity,
such that the private entity may be said to
have acted on behalf of the government rather
than for its own, private purposes.

Mere knowledge of another's independent
action does not produce vicarious
responsibility absent some manifestation of
consent and the ability to control.

The social policies pursued by the government
will often coincide with the social ideals of
many private persons; the coincidence of
these goals falls short of establishing that
the private persons are controlled by the

United States v. Koenig, 856 F.2d at 849-50 (citations omitted).
Here, based on the evidence presented in support of
defendant's motion to suppress, the trial court factually found:
7. Lee Ford had discovered controlled
substances in two previous shipments that
were shipped from the Packaging Store during
the approximately eighteen months that Mr.
Ford has operated that business. On those
occasions, Mr. Ford turned the controlled
substance over to the Park City Police
Department. Mr. Ford was not encouraged or
directed by the Park City Police Department
regarding any future suspicious packages.
8. Lee Ford received no money from any law
enforcement agency for opening the package
shipped by the defendant, and was not an
agent of any law enforcement agency.
9. Other than being married to Detective
Ford, Lee Ford had no other involvement with
the Park City Police Department except as set
forth above.
10. Mr. Ford, when he opened the defendant's
package, did so as a private individual and
not as an agent of the government.
(R. 247; Complete "Findings of Fact" attached in Appendix).
Defendant claims in dispute of these findings that an agency
relationship did exist between Lee Ford and the police because
Ford had opened packages on two prior occasions and found drugs
which he turned over to the police, Ford is married to a
detective and the police did not order Ford to stop opening
packages.

But, such facts, without some showing of control by

the police or direct benefit to Lee Ford, are not sufficient to
establish an agency relationship.

The ultimate focus must be

whether the private citizen acted primarily as an instrument of
the state in conducting the search.

Coolidge v. New Hampshire,

403 U.S. at 487; State v. Watts, 750 P.2d at 1221-22.

In Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971), a
wife turned her husband's guns over to the police in the hope of
clearing him of criminal charges.

The United States Supreme

Court held that such voluntary cooperation with the police did
not constitute an agency relationship where the government
neither exercised coercion or dominance over the wife.
Similarly, where a Federal Express employee opened a package
pursuant to a general corporate policy of inspecting any
suspicious package, no agency relationship was found despite a
history of cooperation between the employee, the carrier and law
enforcement.
1988).

United States v. Koenig, 356 F.2d 843 (7th Cir.

Even where the citizen is a charged informant who traded

information for a dismissal of his charges, no agency
relationship was found where the police only knew generally of
the informant's conduct, but had not given him any specific
directions as to what to search or exercised any control over the
search.

State v. Watts, 750 P.2d 1219 (Utah 1988).
Indeed, the cases cited by defendant are factually

supportable of the trial court's evaluation in this case.

In

People v. De Santis, 399 N.Y.S.2d 514 (N.Y. 1977), the New York
Supreme Court concluded that no agency relationship existed where
an airline ticket agent opened two suspicious bags and then
processed the bags but contacted the police.

No control over the

search could be shown since the police were not even aware of the
search occurring until after the intrusion was complete.
Further, the court noted that a common carrier has a common law
right to inspect goods presented for shipment.

IcL. at 516.

For

similar reasons, no agency relationship was established where an
airport manager entered a car parked illegally at the airport and
opened bags and containers left in the car.

Even though the

manager was a county employee and responsible for security at the
airport, the California state appellate court concluded that the
manager was acting on behalf of the airport and not law
enforcement at the time of the search.

As such, the exclusionary

rule was not applicable to "the large numbers of people employed
by the federal, state and local governments in capacities
entirely unrelated to any element of law enforcement," People v.
Scott, 43 Cal.App.3d 723, 117 Cal.Rptr. 925, 927 (1974).

On the

other hand, where credit card agents, in a joint operation with
police and in the police presence, searched defendant's vehicle
for the sole purpose of finding evidence against him to use in
criminal proceedings, the credit card agents acted as operatives
of the government.

Stapleton v. Superior Court of Los Angeles

County, 70 Cal.2d 97, 447 P.2d 967 (1968).

But compare United

States v. Coleman, 628 F.2d 961 (6th Cir. 1980) (where no agency
relationship was found when the police only stood by during a
private vehicle repossession in case of any altercations but did
not encourage or direct the repossession; held tacit approval is
insufficient).

See also LeFave, Search and Seizure, 2d ed. §

1.8(b), "Private" Searches, at 181, n. 41-43 (1987).
Defendant also cites State v. Boynton, 58 Haw. 530, 574
P.2d 1330 (1978) as supportive of his agency claim.

In Boynton,

an informant was actively recruited by law enforcement to secure
information on drug activities.

The informant was paid by the

police for his information.

Under such circumstances, the court

concluded that an agency relationship existed.

But, as noted by

the Utah Supreme Court, Boynton is factually distinguishable
where, as here, there is no evidence of active recruitment by the
police.

State v. Watts, 750 P.2d at 1223, n. 27. Nor, have

other courts found Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649 (1980)
to be factually controlling where the subject matter searched
does not involve any first amendment considerations.

United

States v. Falcon, 766 F.2d 1469, 1475 (10th Cir. 1985).
Here, there was no evidence presented to establish that
the police recruited, encouraged or otherwise aided Lee Ford's
search of defendant's package.

Lee Ford, like any citizen, was

concerned with cooperating with the police once drugs were found.
There is no evidence that Ford searched defendant's package for
any reason other than concern for his parsonal liability and
potential loss of license should he be found to have facilitated
the shipment of drugs.

The fact that FDrd had searched and found

drugs on two other occasions that the police were aware of and
that the police had not ordered Ford to stop searching does not
constitute sufficient indica of a pre-existing agency
relationship.

Defendant offered nothing to refute these facts

other than speculation that Ford must have been an operative of
the police because he is married to a dstective.

As such, the

trial court's findings that Lee Ford acted independently of the
police and privately searched defendant's pac?<age were wholly
appropriate and must be sustained on appeal.

POINT II
NO WARRANT IS REQUIRED PRIOR TO THE POLICE
LAWFULLY RECEIVING AND SUBSEQUENTLY TESTING
CONTRABAND VOLUNTARILY SURRENDERED BY A
PRIVATE CITIZEN.
Defendant argues that even if Lee Ford did conduct a
private search of defendant's package, the police were required
to secure a warrant prior to receiving the package from Ford (Br.
of App. at 15-17).

Additionally, defendant claims a warrant was

also required prior to the police performing confirmatory
chemical testing of the lawfully seized substance (Br. of App. at
17).

Defendant's position, under the facts of this case, is not

supportable.
While Utah caselaw has not specifically addressed these
3
issues, the United States Supreme Court has.
In United States
v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984), a freight carrier had conducted
a private search of a package, including opening a sealed
container within the package, and had found a controlled
substance.

Carrier personnel then rewrapped the container and

contacted federal drug agents. When the agents received the
package from the private carrier, they reopened the sealed
container without a warrant and field tested the substance,
finding that it was cocaine.

The United States Supreme Court

held that both the warrantless seizure of the package and the
field testing of its contents was permissible since it "did not
3
It should be noted that defendant has not cited any Utah
caselaw or statutory authority in support of his postiton; nor,
has defendant argued for any separate state anaylsis (Br. of App.
at 15-17). Therefore, this Court should limit its constitutional
anaylsis to that of the federal constitution. State v. Johnson,
771 P.2d 326, 327-8 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).

infringe any constitutionally protected privacy interest that had
not already been frustrated as the result of private conduct,"
Id. at 119-20.
In reaching this conclusion, the Court relied on the
legal analysis of Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 656
(1980), that law enforcement may lawfully acquire possession of
materials voluntarily relinquished to the police as a result of
private searches, irrespective of the permissibility or legal
authorization of the private search.
P.2d 1219, 1220 (Utah 1988).

Accord State v. Watts, 750

While the Jacobsen Court

characterized the voluntary relinquishment to the government of
the privately searched materials as a "seizure" under the fourth
amendment, other federal courts, including the Walter court, have
concluded that legally no seizure occurs when materials are
voluntarily turned over to the police by a private citizen.
Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 652-53, n. 4; Coolidge v.
New hd:rtpshire, 403 U.S. 443, 488-89 (1971); United States v.
Coleman, 628 F.2d 961, 966 (6th Cir. 1980); United States v.
Lambert, 771 F.2d 83, 89 (6th Cir.), cert, denied 474 U.S. 1034
(1985); United States v. Sherwin, 539 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1976).
But, whether characterized as a seizure or not, courts have
consistently not required a warrant to be obtained prior to
receiving the items.

Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921);

Jacobsen v. United States, 466 U.S. 109 (1984); Walter v. United
States, 447 U.S. 649 (1980); State v. Watts, 750 P.2d 1219
(1988).

See also Lefave, Search and Seizure, 2d ed. § 1.8(b), at

177 (1987).

The point of analytical diversion in the federal courts
has been with the permissible scope of the government's use of
the lawfully acquired materials once in its possession.

Does the

government's subsequent use compromise any privacy or possessory
interest of the defendant not previously compromised by the
private search; and if so, is the infringement merely de minimis
in light of the prior legitimate infringement?
Jaoobsen, 466 U.S. at 125.

United States v.

Further, divergence is found in the

courts' characterization of whether that subsequent use is or is
not a search subject to constitutional restrictions.

Walter v.

United States, 447 U.S. at 653 (government's projection of film
privately seized constituted a search); United States v.
Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 120 (government's opening of sealed
container previously opened by common carrier was not a search);
United States v. Snowadski, 723 F.2d 1427, 1430 (9th Cir. 1984),
cert, denied 469 U.S. 839 (1984) (government's reading of
documents privately seized by co-worker did not constitute a
search); State v. Dold, 44 Wash.App. 519, 722 P.2d 1353, 1356-57
(1986) (government's reading of letter constituted a search but
was constitutionally permissible since the government's search
did not exceed the scope of the private search).

See also

Junker, "The Structure of the Fourth Amendment: The Scope of
Protection," 79 J. Crim. Law & Criminology 1105 (1989).
However, when presented with the factual situation of
the case at bar, a point of unanimity emerges. When, as here, a
private citizen voluntarily relinquishes materials which are then
in a condition to be plainly viewed, courts have consistently

held that no search or seizure questions arise.

Walter v. United

States, 447 U.S. at 657; United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at
116, 118-19.

See also Coolidqe v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. at

465-71; LeFave, Search and Seizure, §1.3(b), at 182.

In non-

plain view cases, initial fourth amendment considerations arise
in the context of determining the reasonableness of the
governmental search when compared to the private.

But, no

determination considering the scope of the search is relevant to
a plain view relinquishment.

For,

Where a private party has revealed to the
police information he has obtained during a
private search or exposed the results of his
search to plain view, no Fourth Amendment
interest is implicated because the police
have done no more than fail to avert their
eyes.
The private-search doctrine thus has much in
common with the plain-view doctrine, which is
'grounded on the proposition that once police
are lawfully in a position to observe an item
firsthand, its owner's privacy interest in
that item is lost....' Illinpis v. Andreas,
463 U.S. 765, 771 (1983).
United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 130 (concurring opin., J.
White) (emphasis in original) (citation omitted).

Accord State

v. Northrup, 756 P.2d 1288, 1294 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), citing
United States v. Jacobsen (no meaningful interference with any
property interest occurs when evidence is seized in plain view).
But whether the police legitimately become aware that a
container contains contraband through a subsequent reasonable
search, such as in Jacobsen, or because the contraband is
delivered in plain view, such as here, the analysis thereafter is
the same.

May a lawfully acquired substance, which appears to be

a controlled substance, be chemically tested without securing a
search warrant?

The Court in United States v. Jacobsen answered

in the affirmative, stating:
Congress has decided - and there is no
question about its power to do so - to treat
the interest in 'privately' possessing
cocaine as illegitimate, thus governmental
conduct that can reveal whether a substance
is cocaine, and no other arguable 'private'
fact, compromises no legitimate privacy
interest.
466 U.S. at 123.

Further, where the "suspicious nature of the

material made it virtually certain that the substance tested was
in fact contraband . . . the 'seizure' [for testing] could, at
most, have only a de minimis impact on any protected property
interest," United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 125. As such,
confirmatory testing of lawfully seized evidence is "tacitly
assumed to be a permissible incident of such acquisition,"
Junker, J. Crim. L. & C. at 1145. Accord State v. Hansen, 732
P.2d 127 (Utah 1987) (police need not secure separate warrants to
search individual containers located on property described in
valid warrant).
While isolated cases, such as United States v. Mulder,
808 F.2d 1346 (9th Cir. 1987), cited by defendant, have applied
Jacobsen solely to field testing as opposed to chemical lab
testing, such an analysis fails to properly evaluate the
defendant's substantially compromised or even extinguished
privacy and possessory interests by the prior private search and
subsequent lawful governmental acquisition of the property.
Mulder creates a narrow and artificial application of privacy
interests unrecognized by other courts.

Indeed, even the Ninth

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has only narrowingly applied its
own holding.

United States v. Snyder, 852 F.2d 471, 473, n.l

(9th Cir. 1988) (Mulder limited to private search cases where
scope of governmental search exceeds private search).
More analytically correct are the courts which have
refused to artificially restrict common police usage of otherwise
lawfully secured evidence.

In United States v. Walsh, 791 F.2d

811 (10th Cir. 1986), the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed
both Walter and Jacobsen and concluded that no warrant was
necessary where a private search revealed firearms located in a
suitcase and the police merely inspected the firearms for serial
numbers.

The court rejected Walter as being factually

inapplicable because the firearms were in plain view when
delivered to the police; therefore, any privacy interest had
already been compromised by the private search.

Further, the

court found that since the police had lawfully acquired
possession, there was no constitutional requirement that a
warrant be obtained prior to either the field testing of the
powder or subsequent ballistic testing.
6.

Id. at 815, and 817, n.

Similarly, in State v. Gentry, 450 So.2d 773 (La. App. 5 Cir.

1984), no warrant was required where a private search revealed a
powdery substance which was then turned over to the government
and subsequently chemically analyzed.

Citing Walter and

Jacobsen, the court concluded that "[o]nce the private search
reveals the item the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit
governmental use of the item as evidence," Ld. at 775.
Overruling prior state caselaw, the Oregon Supreme Court en banc
held:

When there is probable cause to believe that
a lawfully seized substance is a controlled
substance, a chemical test, for the sole
purpose of determining whether or not it is a
controlled substance, is neither a 'search'
nor a 'seizure' under [the state
constitutional provision]. It is not a
'search' if the purpose of the test of a
lawfully seized item is to confirm the
presence of whatever the police have probable
cause to believe is present in that item. A
test for such a limited purpose does not
infringe any privacy interest protected by
the Oregon Constitution. Likewise, a test
for this limited purpose is not a 'seizure.'
A 'seizure' occurs when there is a
significant interference with a person's
possessory or ownership interests in
property. The seizure of an article by the
police and the retention of it (even
temporarily) is a significant intrusion into
a person's possessory interest in that
'effect.' However, once the item has been
lawfully seized, the person's possessory
interest in that property has been
substantially reduced. The additional
retention of the item, for the limited
purpose of chemical analysis or testing, is
not a substantial interference with that
possessory interest. While it is true that
the testing of the item may change a
temporary interference with a small amount of
the substance into a permanent deprivation,
the amount destroyed by testing in most cases
is so small that any effect on a person's
property interest is de minimis.
State v. Owens, 302 Or. 196, 729 P.2d 524, 530-31 (1986).

In

Owens, the police had seized, incident to arrest, the purse of
the defendant.
vial".

Inside the purse was a "small, transparent amber

The police seized the vial and sent it to the state crime

lab for analysis.
with possession.

Several weeks later, the defendant was charged
The court concluded it was unreasonable to

require any warrant for such confirmatory chemical testing.
Here, Lee Ford, as a private citizen, examined the full
contents of defendant's package and could determine even from his

observations that the package contained marijuana.
package open and the contents exposed.

He left the

When the police took

possession of the items, no further opening of the package or its
contents was necessary to visually determine that the contents
contained marijuana.

Based on these observations, the police

were able to obtain a search warrant foe defendant's home.
Apparently, sometime thereafter, a confirmatory chemical test was
performed by the state lab.

Under these facts any privacy or

possessory property rights infringement compromised by the
testing was de minimis, where the police could visually determine
that the contents contained marijuana at the time Lee Ford
voluntarily turned the package over to them.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY CONCLUDED THAT THE
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF THE SEARCH WARRANT
FOR DEFENDANT'S HOME WAS SUFFICIENT TO
SUPPORT PROBABLE CAUSE.
Defendant attempts to assert that the state standard
for reviewing the sufficiency of affidavits issued in support of
search warrants is a stricter standard than that of the federal
(Br. of App. at 17-23).

He does not assert that the language of

the state constitutional provision is more demanding than the
federal; but, claims that state caselaw has retained the
Aguillar-Spinelli standard despite the Illinois v. Gates, 462
U.S. 213 (1983), "totality of the circumstances" test.

The

fallacy of defendant's argument lies in his misinterpretation
that the two tests are mutually exclusive.

Rather, as recognized

by the United States Supreme Court in adopting the "totality of
the circumstances" test, as well as the Utah appellate courts in

embracing it, the sufficiency-reliability factors of Aguillar and
4
Spinelli are still appropriate for consideration but not for
rigid application.

Massachusetts v. Upton, 104 S.Ct. 2085

(1984); State v. Hansen, 732 P.2d 127, 130 (Utah 1987).

Indeed,

the "totality of the circumstances" test is not a new test as
much as a more proper application of prior caselaw.
Gates, 462 U.S. 213, [543-4].

Illinois v.

Under the totality of the

circumstances, "veracity," "reliability," and "basis of
knowledge" remain highly relevant, but not as entirely separate
and independent rigid requirements.

Instead, they are "closely

intertwined issues that may usefully illuminate the common sense,
practical question whether there is 'probable cause' to believe
that contraband or evidence is located in a particular place,"
Id. at [543]
Similarly, this Court has recognized that:
Both the Utah Constitution, article I,
section 14, and the fourth amendment to the
United States Constitution require that
issuance of search warrants be based upon
'probable cause supported by oath or
affirmation.' Whether an affidavit for a
search warrant meets the probable-cause
standard is determined by the 'totality of
the circumstances' analysis of Illinois v.
Gates [cite omitted]. In a line of cases
beginning with State v. Anderton, 668 P.2d
1258 (Utah 1983), the Utah Supreme Court
adopted the Gates standard. Factors to be
considered include, among others, the
veracity, reliability, and basis of knowledge
of confidential informants, and whether the
judicial officer issuing the warrant reached
a practical, common sense decision. State v.
Hansen, 732 P.2d 127 (Utah 1987). The weight
accorded these factors may vary according to
Aguillar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964) and Spinelli v. United
States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969).

the circumstances.
1203 (Utah 1984) .

State v. Bailey, 675 P.2d

State v. Ayala, 762 P.2d 1107, 1109-10 (Utah Ct. App- 1988),
cert, denied 773 P.2d 45 (1989).

Accord State v. Babbell, 770

P.2d 987, 990-91 (Utah 1989); State v. Miller, 740 P.2d 1363,
1365 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1277 (Utah 1987);
State v. Anderson, 701 P.2d 1099, 1101 (Utah 1985).
Further, in reviewing an affidavit, an appellate court
is not to conduct a de novo proceeding, but review the affidavit
to determine if, taken as a whole, there exists a substantial
basis for the lower court's finding of probabLe cause. State v.
Stromberg, 121 Utah Adv. Rep. 22, 23 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); State
v. Babbell, 7 70 P.2d at 991.

In doing so, the reviewing court

must afford great deference for preserving the integrity of the
warrant and deferring to the trial court's ruling.

I_d. ; State v.

Hansen, 732 P.2d at 129.
Defendant claims that the affidavit alleges only two
facts in support of probable cause; first, that defendant sent a
package containing marijuana and secondly, that defendant lives
at the address to be searched.

Defendant also argues that the

warrant is insufficient because it contains no proof of Lee
Ford's veracity and reliability (Br. of App. at 22-23).
Contrary to defendant's assertions, the affidavit is
clearly sufficient.

(Copy of Affidavit attached in Appendix.)

When taken as a whole, the affidavit established that a named
private citizen was personally handed a pre-wrapped package by
defendant, whom the citizen knew by face and name from previous
business transactions.

The package was subsequently searched by

the citizen who found it to contain dog bones and marijuana•
citizen voluntarily surrendered the package to the police.

The

The

citizen also supplied documentation containing defendant's name
and telephone number, which documentation was filled out by
defendant to ship the package.

The police corroborated the

information given by the named private citizen by personally
observing the package and documentation.

Further investigation

revealed that the telephone number given by defendant was listed
to a home identified, through another officer's personal
knowledge, as being the home of defendant.

The warrant was

sought the day after defendant had delivered the package to the
citizen for shipping.
The warrant sought both the copy of the documentation
which would evidence that defendant had in fact personally
shipped the package and evidence of other controlled substances.
Both items were logical extensions of defendant's activities in
shipping the package of marijuana.

That both items would be

located at defendant's only know address, close in proximity to
the shipping store, and consistent with the identifying
information given to the shipper is also common sense.
Each fact in the affidavit was personally observed and
corroborated by law enforcement but for the initial statement of
Lee Ford that it was defendant who presented the package for
shipment.

State v. Anderson, 701 P.2d at 1102. However,

contrary to defendant's assertion, a private citizen, as opposed
to a confidential informant, is presumed to be truthful. State v.
Miller, 740 P.2d 1363, 1366 (Utah Ct. App. 1987), cert, denied

765 P.2d 12778 (Utah 1977).

Nor, is the veracity of the average

neighbor witness subject to rigid scrutiny.

State v. Treadway,

28 Utah 2d 160, 499 P.2d 846, 848 (1972).
Defendant is really challenging the assumption of the
lower court that it is logical and a common sense result that a
drug shipper would have the documentation concerning shipping, as
well as other substances shipped, in his home. Again, such a
factual inference as been viewed as a natural corollary of
probable cause. United States v. Valenzuela, 596 F.2d 824, 829
(9th Cir.), cert, denied 441 U.S. 965 (1979).

Certainty is not

at issue; but, the reasonableness of the probability that the
evidence will be at the location searched.

State v. Anderson,

701 P.2d at 1101; State v. Bailey, 675 P.2d 1203, 1205 (1984).
In judging probable cause issuing magistrates
are not to be confined by niggardly
limitations or by restrictions on the use of
their common sense, and that their
determination of probable cause should be
paid great deference by reviewing courts.
State v. Anderton, 668 P.2d 1258, 1260 (Utah 1983), quoting
Spinelli v. United States.
Defendant also claims that the issuing magistrate
granted even greater invasions of privacy by allowing for a noknock provision (Br. of App., Point IIIB, at 23).
cited in support.

No cases are

This Court has previously concluded that

where, as here, the items to be seized could be easily concealed
or destroyed a no-knock provision is permissible.
Miller, 740 P.2d 1363 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
was not in fact made under the provision.

State v.

Additionally, entry
Instead, the police

announced their presence, and when no one was home, emtered the
nrpmiqpR

in t h e dav licrht

hours.

announced their presence, and when no one was home, entered the
premises in the day light hours.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, respondent respectfully
submits that the order of the trial court denying defendant's
motion to suppress should be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this

day of January,

1990.
R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General

CHRISTINE F. SOLTIS
Assistant Attorney General
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APPENDIX A

Robert W. Adkins #0028
Summit County Attorney
Summit County Courthouse
P. 0. Box 128
Coalville, Utnh 84017
Telephone: (801) 3%-446R
Attorney for P l a i n t i f f
IN THE THIRD DISTPICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUTfiTY
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

:
Plaintiff,
vs

JOHN T. MURPHY,
Defendant.

:
:

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW REGARDING DEFENDANT\S
MOTION TO SUPPRESS

:

Criminal No. 1220

:

Defendant's Motion to suppress came on regularly for hearing before the
Court on February 6, 1989, a t the hour of 1:30 p.m.; the State was representpd
by Robert W. Adkins, Summit County Attorney, and the defendant was present and
represented by his a t t o r n e y , Loni F. DeLand.

The Court having listened to the

evidence presented, the Memorandums of the p a r t i e s , and the arguments of
counsel, and being fully advised in the premises, now nekes i t s
FINDINGS OF FACT

1.

On September 19, 1988, defendant, John T. Murphy,

entered The

Packaging Store in Park City, Utah, which i s owned by Lee Ford, and requested
t h a t Mr. Ford ship a package by Federal Express.
2.

The defendant paid for the shipment, and received a Federal Express Air

B i l l / R e c e i p t for the package.
3.

Defendant then l e f t The Packaging Store and l a t e r Lee Ford opened the

package, because he was suspicious as to i t s contents.

Lee Ford had noticed

t h a t the packag? r a t t l e d when i t was brought in by the defendant, and the
defendant's explanation was t h a t i t contained "dog bones".
4.

Upon opening the package, Lee Ford discovered t h a t i t contained a green

leafy substance, which he believed to be marijuana.
5.

Lee Ford contacted the Park City Police Department, and talked to his

wife, Mary Ford, who i s a Detective.
6.

Mary Ford canp to The Packaging Store, and Lee Ford turned the package

over to Detective Ford, and told her what had occurred.
7.

Lee Ford ted discovered controlled substances in two previous

shipments t h a t were shipped from The Packaging Store during the approximately
eighteen months t h a t Mr. Ford has operated t h a t business.

On those occasions,

Mr. Ford turned the controlled substance over to the Park City Police
Department.

Mr. Ford was not encouraged or directed by the Park City Police

Department regarding any future suspicious packages.
8.

Lee Ford received no money from any law enforcement agency for opening

the package shipped by the defendant, and was not an agent of any law
enforcement agency.
9.

Other than being married to Detective Ford, Lee Ford had no other

involvement with the Park City Police Department except as s e t forth above.
10.

Mr. Ford, when he opened the defendant's package, did so as a private

individual and not as an agent of the government.
11.

Detective Ford removed the package to the Park City Police Department,

where she and Detective P i r r a g l i o attempted to locate the whereabouts of the
defendant.
12.

On the r e c e i p t , a copy of which had been turned over to Detective Ford

by Lee Ford, the defendant had placed his telephone number.

Detectives

P i r r a g l i o and Ford checked the telephone number and discovered t h a t i t was
l i s t e d to the defendant's homa in Hoytsville, Utah, and verified t h a t the
defendant in f a c t resided t h e r e .
13.

On September 20, 1988, a search warrant was obtained from the Third

D i s t r i c t Court to search the defendant's home in Hoytsville for the Federal
Express Air Bill/Receipt and controlled substances.
14.

The search warrant was executed on the premises on September 20, 1988,

and the police recovered the Federal Express Air B i l l / R e c e i p t and marijuana,
cash, drug paraphernalia, and records r e f l e c t i n g drug trafficking.
15.

The drug paraphernalia, cash, and records, r e f l e c t i n g drug trafficking

were in plain view when thp search warrant was executed.
16.

Shortly a f t e r the search warrant was executed, the defendant and his

wife were stopped on the highway near t h e i r home, and the defendant was
arrested.

After the defendant's a r r e s t , a search was conducted of the vehicle

t h a t the defendant was driving, and marijuana was recovered therefrom.
defendant's wife signed a Consent to Search form for the vehicle.

The

Tha

defendant claims consent was not freely obtained, but the defendant failed
to submit any evidence on t h a t issue.
Tha court having rade the foregoing Findings of Fact, now nnkes the
following
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Defendant's Motion to Suppress with regard to the contents of the

package mailed a t The Packaging Store should be denied.
2.

Defendant's Motion to Suppress with regard to the Federal Express Air

B i l l / R e c e i p t , marijuana, money, drug paraphernalia, and records r e f l e c t i n g drug

trafficking a c t i v i t i e s , a l l of which were located a t thp defendant's residence,
should be denied.
3.

Defendant's Motion to Suppres the maariuana recovered from the search

of the vehicle driven by the defendant should be denied.

is J ^ y Of fl||tf,ML/,

DATED t h i s

1989.
BY THE COURT:

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby c e r t i f y t h a t I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, postage prepaid, t h i s ^Y^-

day of

February, t989, to Loni F. DeLand, attorney for defendant, a t 132 South 600
East, S a l t Lake City, Utah 84102.

APPENDIX B

In The

THIRD DISTRICT

Court

In and for Summit County
STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH
ss
COUNTY OF SUMMIT

Affidavit for Search Warrant
Summit County Courthouse
Michael R. Murphy
^ 60 No, Main, Coalville, Utah
JUDGE
'
ADDRESS
The undersigned being first duly sworn deposes and says
That Affiant has reason to believe
That ( ) on the per6on(s) of
fcx) on the premises known as 9S5 South West H o y t s v i l l g Road - T r a i l e r House
( ) in the vehicles) described as
In the CSKxaSXXxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
County of Summit, State of Utah, there is now certain
propert> or evidence described as
BEFORE

Marihuana and c o n t r o l l e d s u b s t a n c e s and
R e c e i p t / F e d e r a l E x p r e s s A i r b i l l - Package Tracking No. 9189681561

and that said property or evidence
( 50 is unlawfully acquired or unlawfully possessed
( X) has been used as a means of committing a public offense
( X) is being possessed with the purpose to use it as a means of committing or concealing a public offense
( X) consists of an item or constitutes evidence of illegal conduct, possessed by a party to the illegal conduct
( ) consists of an item or constitutes evidence of illegal conduct, possessed by a person or entity not a party
to the illegal conduct
.
.
.
I believe the property and evidence described above is evidence of the crime of D i s t r i b u t i o n o f
Controlled Substances
The facts to establish the grounds for issuance of a Search Warrant are. Affiant is employed as
a Detective for the Park City Police Department. On September 19, 1988,
Park City Police Officer, Mary Ford, was contacted by Mr. Lee Ford, who
is the owner of the Packaging Store, 750 Kearns Blvd.r Park City, Utah,
who informed Officer Mary Ford that a package had been left with his
store, which he believed contained Marijuana. Officer Mary Ford went
to the Packaging Store, and talked to Lee Ford. Lee Ford said to Officer
Mary Ford that a person, who was known to him as J. Murphy came to the
Packaging Store the worning of September 19, 1988, and wanted to ship
a package Federal Express. Mr. Ford said that he had shipped other
packages for J. Murphy, and that is how he had become acquainted with
him. Mr. Ford described J. Murphy as approximately 40 years of age,
grey hair# a beard, and a birthmark on his left cheek. Lee Ford said

that he shook the package which had been brought to him and it
rattled, and he asked Mr. Murphy what was in it. Mr. Murphy replied
that it was dog biscuits which were a present for his sister. Mr.
Murphy filled out the Federal Express Airbill, and indicated that
the sender was one J. Murry, and that it was being shipped to one
Jim Frank in Salida, California. Mr. Lee Ford told Officer Mary
Ford that after J. Murphy left the Packaging Store, that he opened
the package to prepare it for shipment. Upon opening the package,
Mr. Ford told Officer Ford that he observed a green leafy substance,
which appeared to be marijuana, and at that point contacted Officer
Ford. Following Officer Ford's arrival at the Packaging Store,
she took possession of the package which had been brought in by
J. Murphy, together with the Federal Express Airbill. The Federal
Express Airbill and the package were then taken to the Park City
Police Department and turned over to your affiant, Detective Pat
Pirraglio. Detective Pirraglio knows a J. Murphy, who matches the
description given by Lee Ford of the person who brought the package
to the Packaging Store. The affiant has knowledge of the foregoing
information, because he has talked personally with Officer Mary
Ford regarding the incident. The affiant inspected the Federal
Express Airbill, and the phone number for the shipper, is 801-3362043. The affiant has checked telephone number 801-336-2043 through
U. S. West Communications in Salt Lake City, and has determined that
that phone number is listed to one Etta Place, 985 South West
Hoytsville Road, Coalville, Utah. On September 19, 1988, Detective
Pirraglio talked to Lt. Louis Stevens of the Summit County Sheriff's
Department to determine who lives at that address on Hoytsville
Road. Lt. Stevens told the affiant that the address is next door
to his home, and the person living there is a John Murphy. Lt.
Stevens described the person he knew as John Murphy, and that
description matched the description which Lee Ford had given for
J. Murphy.
WHEREFORE, the affiant prays that a Search Warrant is
issued for the seizure of said items at any time day or night because
there is reason to believe it is necessary to seize the property prior
to it being concealed, destroyed, damaged, or altered.
It is further requested that the affiant executing the
requested warrant not be required to give notice of affiant's
authority or purpose because the property^s^ught^may^bequi^kly destroyed
or disposed of.

SUBSCRIBED and sworn to before me this 20th day of
September, 1988.

Michael R. Murphy, District Judge

